O ur goal is to assess the strategic and operational benefits of electronic integration for industrial procurement. We conduct a field study with an industrial supplier and examine the drivers of performance of the procurement process. Our research quantifies both the operational and strategic impacts of electronic integration in a B2B procurement environment for a supplier. Additionally, we show that the customer also obtains substantial benefits from efficient procurement transaction processing. We isolate the performance impact of technology choice and ordering processes on both the trading partners. A significant finding is that the supplier derives large strategic benefits when the customer initiates the system and the supplier enhances the system's capabilities. With respect to operational benefits, we find that when suppliers have advanced electronic linkages, the order-processing system significantly increases benefits to both parties.
Introduction
A significant body of literature examines the strategic aspects of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) (e.g., Wang and Seidmann 1995, Raghunathan and Yeh 2000) , yet there has been no systematic empirical assessment of the strategic benefits of this technology. Recent field studies in the auto industry (Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995 , Srinivasan et al. 1994 ) documented gains to customers, however, there are very few studies that address the technology benefits from the supplier's perspective. Some researches have even cautioned that suppliers may not gain much from EDI (e.g., Benjamin et al. 1990 ). Our research fills this gap and quantifies both the operational and strategic impacts of electronic integration in a B2B procurement environment for a supplier. In addition, we show that the customer also obtains substantial benefits from efficient procurement transaction processing.
Our research framework includes three sequential phases of technology deployment. We characterize these phases as adoption, implementation, and postimplementation. In the context of this three-phase framework, our focus is on the second phase to identify explicitly both the direct strategic impact and the operational improvement upon technology implementation. Our model recognizes the nature of adoption choices in Phase 1, and projects the potential long-term strategic gains in Phase 3.
First we examine strategic benefits of electronic integration in B2B procurement processes as measured by gains in business from customers. We postulate that the supplier derives maximum benefits when a customer initiates the system and the supplier enhances the system's capabilities. From a theoretical perspective, this scenario creates the highest reduction in transaction costs for the buyer and the maximum negative externalities for other suppliers. Our hypothesis is supported by the field study. With respect to operational process benefits for both parties, we find that establishing advanced EDI capabilities with customers significantly improves the performance of the order-processing system as measured by both the accuracy of order processing and timeliness of payments. Both parties benefit from reduced support resources required for the order-management function.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In §2, we elaborate the research framework, while in §3 we frame the research questions for a systematic assessment of the strategic benefits of implementing electronic integration. In §4 we examine the operational benefits of integration. We explain implications of our research framework and findings in §5. We offer our concluding remarks in §6.
Research Framework
We elaborate our three-phase research framework depicted in Figure 1 . In the first phase, the focus is on the selection of the pair of characteristics of technology and business partners (Riggins and Mukhopadhyay 1999, Premkumar et al. 1994) . For instance, the outcome of this phase is the selection of customer type (size, industry, etc.) and the set of EDI transactions (purchase order, invoice, etc.). Once the adoption process is complete, the emphasis shifts to measuring the benefits of the technology implementation in Phase 2. The impacts are of two types: (a) direct strategic impact typically in terms of sales gains, and (b) transaction processing impact typically in terms of process-based operational measures. Finally, in Phase 3, the improvement in operational measures as evidenced in Phase 2 bring in further (indirect) strategic benefits. It is clear that the last type of benefit accrues over an extended period of time, and captures the long-term potential of technology deployment and use.
Choices faced by management in the B2B Electronic Procurement arena can also be examined using this framework. The first critical question (Impact A) is whether the implementation of the technology strengthens the business relationship between customers and suppliers, and in turn leads to customers rewarding those suppliers who adopt the technology (Owens and Minor, Inc. 2000) . This is the direct strategic benefit of electronic integration. Often such technology adoption decisions are made in faith (Kekre et al. 1999) , and only recently has an activity-based pricing system been used to quantify the nature and magnitude of the anticipated benefits. Thus there is a paucity of scientific analysis that clearly establishes the impact of technology on strategic measures. Besides the strategic measures, the operational measures of relevant business processes (e.g., orderprocessing cycle) also improve (Impact B) at both the supplier and customer ends. Over time, the gains in operational measures lead to additional gains in strategic measures (Impact C). Thus the operational gains act as a secondary driver of enhanced strategic gains in Phase 3. Our framework captures the total strategic gain comprising of the direct strategic impact of technology (A), and the derived strategic gains (C) from operational improvements through impact (B).
Note that similar strategic and operational gains are also accrued at the customer's end. However, we are limited to supplier-related data in terms of both these measures. For instance, our modeling of reduction in transaction errors related to payments and orders confirms decreased burden at both ends of the information-processing chain. We are thus able to identify specific activities in the procurement process that lead to operational benefits to both trading partners. A lack of customer-specific data limits us to study strategic gains of the supplier, and the operational benefits to both parties arising from electronic integration.
Given our focus on Phase 2, we carefully selected the appropriate research methodologies to quantify separately each impact (A and B). We were confronted
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with two options for the research design. The first, and probably more conventional choice, was to use a regression-based model to link the benefits with the underlying factors. The advantage of this approach is that it allows one to jointly determine the effect of not only technology choices, but also other control variables. The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires both identification and measurement of the control variables. Clearly the operational process benefits that are internal in scope do lend to this research approach. Therefore, we adopted the regression-based approach for the operational process benefits for which data were available from the research site.
However, for the analysis of strategic measures, such an approach was not feasible at our research site. The regression-based approach would have required both the measurement of variables of external context (e.g., industry size and growth, competitive scenarios) or revealing sensitive data (customer-specific data). Both these requirements were not practical. The alternative was to use a quasi-experimental design to assess the differential impact of technology choices. Using two sets of matched pairs (with and without technology stimulus) we could isolate the impact of technology deployment. Such an approach is thus useful where the measurement of control variables is difficult or not available for proprietary reasons.
The focus of this paper in light of the framework in Figure 1 is twofold. First, we quantify the effect of Impact B by examining the process performance in the order-processing area of a large industrial supplier. A snapshot of the operational metrics of a cross-section of the customers provides us with the opportunity to tease out the direct impact of the technology on process performance. Second, we assess the business growth from the supplier's perspective, and capture the strategic benefits. Our analysis is supplemented by an empirical study of the order-processing system of Precision Metal Inc. (PMI), 1 a Fortune 500 supplier of tools, tooling systems, and services. We had three reasons for selecting this company. First, for a significant number of EDI customers, PMI had comparable customers with manual links, thus allowing us to examine the differential gains from the use of EDI. Second, we had the opportunity to examine the effect of varying levels of electronic linkage, process-management characteristics, order complexity, and volumes of business in PMI order-processing system. Third, we could study first-hand the ordermanagement process and thus assess the operational impact of EDI. These factors in the natural experiment permit us to rigorously test the framework depicted in Figure 1 .
Strategic Benefits
As explained earlier, an analysis of the strategic benefits of electronic integration requires an assessment of the direct gains arising from technology (Impact A) and the follow-up gains (Impact C) from operating efficiencies generated at both the supplier and customer ends. An interesting question is whether the payoff from technology varies with the extent of enhanced technology deployment in the buyersupplier links. Another factor that determines the amount of payoff relates to the identity of the initiator (the supplier or the customer).
We turn first to the direct impact of technology choice via Impact A. The underlying driver of this impact is the identity of the initiator of the system. If the buyer initiates the link, we expect the buyer to be less likely to give in to opportunism (Williamson 1985) . As the initiator of the system, the buyer is likely to reap benefits from the system if the supplier complies with the buyer. We therefore argue, that a supplier that joins a buyer's system gets more business from the buyer than a supplier that entices a buyer to join its own system, ceteris paribus.
Besides the direct impact of technology through Impact A, our framework also captures additional gains (Impact C) that can be obtained to both the supplier and customer resulting from higher operating process efficiencies. In particular, we argue that technological choices drive operating gains (Impact B), which in turn act as the driver for Impact C. The technological choices adopted in the supplier-customer linkage, however, vary widely. For example, consider Supplier A who receives purchase orders using a "teletype link" that requires manual reentry of the incoming orders. In contrast, Supplier B receives purchase orders and sends advance shipping notices using an integrated electronic connection. We expect the buyer to do more business with Supplier B, ceteris paribus. The issue is how significant are the gains from integrated technology choices (Impact B and, subsequently, C) . This aspect of operational gains in order-fulfillment processes is examined in §4.
For the total effect of A and C, we model the strategic impact as the business benefits generated by EDI through changes in the relationship between the trading partners. We use gains in sales volume as the key measure of strategic benefit. The lure of increased sales to the customer is probably the most common motive behind strategic applications of IT. Although the option to pay a premium price has been discussed in the literature, most cases do not report a buyer paying a higher price to a supplier using an electronic linkage (e.g., Clemons and Row 1988) . We found this to be true at PMI, since the pricing policy was uniform across EDI and manual customers. Nonetheless, PMI obtained additional business differentially across its customer base. Our study isolates the drivers of this gain in terms of technology choices and the consequential efficient procurement processing.
These strategic gains in our model depend on the nature of technology choices made by the trading partners. Figure 2 provides a summary of the different types of linkages analyzed. The empirical analysis teases out the effect of the following factors described above.
(1) Customer-initiated versus supplier-initiated EDI links (2) Simple versus enhanced EDI links. Next we formulate our hypotheses related to the impacts of these factors and make pair-wise comparisons to test the hypotheses. Our first hypothesis examines the base-level EDI impact. No prior study has tested this hypothesis, so we test to verify that it holds in all cases. The implementation of EDI by a supplier in itself does not signal strong asset specificity. National standards (X12) have made EDI investment in a trading relationship transferable to another (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994) . This hypothesis does not take account of neither the role of the initiator 
Hypothesis 1. A supplier's implementation of an electronic linkage with customers is associated with higher strategic benefits for the supplier.
Next we consider the case of a B2B-procurement link initiated by a customer. When the customer initiates the EDI link, the customer is keen to realize the full benefits of its investments in EDI through reduced transaction costs. This generates positive externalities for the buyer and negative externalities for nonparticipating suppliers (Riggins et al. 1994) . To eliminate errors and delays associated with inefficient manual processing, customers invest in EDI technology and initiate electronic links with suppliers. However, because of costs and complexities involved with EDI, some suppliers are reluctant to implement the new technology and processes (Meier and Chismar 1991) . The major cost components include additional hardware, software development and maintenance, joint testing of transaction sets, and training of operating personnel. Those suppliers who make these investments to comply with the customer's request and help the customer realize the potential gains are, in turn, rewarded. These suppliers receive preferential treatment in the form of higher business relative to others who continue with the old manual linkage. Consequently, the customer awards more business to EDI enhancements include features such as establishing an integrated electronic link and capabilities for transmitting additional transaction sets. We argue that, in either case, the supplier brings about fundamental changes in the "procedural specificity" (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994) of the exchange process by altering the flows of content and the quality of information. For example, at PMI, the institution of the electronic invoice transaction altered the way the buyer and supplier handled payments. We therefore hypothesize that the supplier increases the level of asset specificity by enhancing its EDI link with the buyer and reduces the buyer's transaction costs further. The increased asset specificity and reduced transaction costs further motivate the buyer to award more business to the supplier. An example of this scenario at our research site is described next.
Consider the example of EDI integration for order processing. PMI has made substantial investments to develop a relational database that maps its own product engineering data with customers' procurement database. It also accommodates multiple data formats. Such a system is critical in terms of reducing the overheads associated with order conflicts (e.g., wrong part code or an obsolete part). Such conflicts often arise given the high level of engineering change orders being issued. The integrated EDI allows the customer production department to directly release electronic orders to PMI without verification. In absence of integration, the order has to be further verified by the customer procurement department as well as the engineering department at PMI. The integration also eliminates the need for the order to be printed at PMI and reentered after verification, thus reducing time and errors. Clearly, integration substantially improves the order processing at each end, therefore increasing procedural specificity. Efficient process enabled by integration reduces customer costs and makes it easier to do business with PMI. Hypothesis 3 thus posits that arising from these gains by the customer, enhanced EDI leads to higher strategic benefits. Note that mere presence of an EDI link does not inject this level of procedural specificity, and may not lead to strategic benefits. While we suggest association between technology deployment and strategic benefit in Hypothesis 1, we assert the direction of causality for both Hypotheses 2 and 3 by identifying the underlying improvements in order processing.
Hypothesis 3. A supplier's implementation of "enhanced" features of the electronic linkage with customers leads to higher strategic benefits for the supplier.
Our motivation for the next hypothesis is to ascertain the evolution of the electronic linkage over time, and its strategic impact. In other words, we now consider the total benefit of Impacts A and C over time. Based on our framework, the Impact C would be stronger as the customer realizes the gains from operating efficiencies in the order fulfillment process over time. A contrary view in the literature is based on the concept of the sustainable strategic advantage (Clemons and Row 1991) . According to this view, EDI provides a competitive advantage for a supplier only in the short run, as other suppliers will also adopt EDI. EDI-related gains thus will no longer remain a source of comparative advantage in the long term. These two contradicting views provide the basis for the next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. A supplier's implementation of the electronic linkage with customers is associated with strategic benefits for the supplier only in the short run.
We test this hypothesis for the short term (4a), medium term (4b), and long term (4c).
Research Approach. We use a quasi-experimental design similar to the study of electronic integration between an insurance carrier and its agents by Venkatraman and Zaheer (1990) . We select an "experimental group" of customers with links to PMI and a second set of customers, the "control group," which matches the experimental group in certain key characteristics but do not have the electronic linkage. We then compare the performance of these paired groups to capture the strategic benefits.
Matched-pairs comparison requires striking a balance between the sample size and the number of factors used to match the pairs. Increasing the number of factors results in better control of the effects of confounding factors, but reduces the size of the sample. Thus the researcher should selectively use those factors as matching criteria that lead to effective control without sacrificing sample size. In our case, we used two criteria (size and three-digit SIC code). These factors were identified based on an analysis of the nature of business, and can be argued to have high correlation with other factors such as sales growth. Our research design therefore reflects the hard choices between control and statistical validity through careful selection of factors for matching. Table 1 provides a summary of the pair wise comparisons that we made to test the hypotheses. We selected our sample in two steps. First, based on available budget for data collection, we randomly selected 200 customers from among those who had implemented the electronic linkage with PMI at least six months prior to our study period. Second, we matched each selected EDI customer with a manual customer in terms of customer size (sales) and the industry (based on three-digit SIC codes). Fortyone EDI customers were dropped from the sample because good match for them was unavailable. We had no comparable manual customer with similar annual revenue in the same industry group. The final count of EDI and manual customer pairs were 159 in each set.
A description of our sample is summarized in Table 2 . This table includes both the EDI and non-EDI customers. It shows the distribution of the sample across major sectors (two-digit SIC codes) and the size of the customers in terms of sales. We have subdivided the customers from the manufacturing sector into automobiles, metals, computers, and other manufacturing groups. A customer in our sample corresponds to a business account; thus, a large automobile company may have multiple plants, each representing a different business account.
A majority of our sample was from the manufacturing sector (63%). The remainder of the sample was from the mining (3.1%), construction (6.9%), transportation (7.5%), wholesale (10.1%), and retail (9.4%) sectors. As expected, the customers in the sample had a wide range of EDI linkages with PMI. Of the 159 EDI customers, 64 were identified as initiators of the system. In terms of EDI commitment, we found that PMI had a simple EDI linkage with 91 customers. Their electronic orders were printed and rekeyed into the order-processing system. The remaining 68 customers had enhanced EDI linkage. PMI had implemented integrated-EDI linkage and/or electronic invoicing with these customers.
The EDI customers were also classified in terms of the length of time for which they had electronic linkage with PMI. For example, 21 customers had established the linkage recently (between 6 and 18 months), years. This classification of the EDI customers allowed us to ascertain whether the duration of the electronic connection affected the level of strategic benefits.
Results and Discussion. We use pair-wise tests for our hypotheses. Our results, summarized in Table 3 , confirm that, although EDI customers on an average offered more business to the supplier, the difference between EDI and manual customers is not significant. This result does not support Hypothesis 1. The key insight, therefore, is that the mere institution of an electronic linkage does not seem to result in significant strategic benefits.
The results of the remaining hypotheses are clear confirmation of strategic benefits. It is confirmed that a supplier sees additional sales when the customer initiates the system p < 0 10 . The converse of this result also has statistical merit (not reported in Table 3 ). Sales performance is not significantly different for the group of EDI customers that did not initiate the electronic integration. This result vindicates the distinction made between the initiators and followers of the electronic exchanges in the literature (e.g., Riggins et al. 1994) .
The supplier's implementation of enhanced EDI capabilities favors the supplier. Customers reward a supplier that introduces procedural specificity in the exchange process by making additional investments to improve the electronic linkage. This result thus provides strong support to Hypothesis 3 p < 0 05 . We also find that there is no statistically significant difference between business received from customers with simple EDI linkage and business from manual customers.
Hypothesis 4 examined the role of the age of the EDI linkage. Note that the sample size for Hypothesis 4a is small (n = 21) and thus requires the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test. Surprisingly, the scope for strategic benefits is low if the EDI linkage has not matured. PMI, however, received additional sales (p < 0 10) from customers that had an electronic linkage for more than three and half years, rejecting Hypothesis 4.
Note that the results of Hypothesis 4 are clearly counterintuitive. They contradict the idea of a sustainable strategic advantage (Clemons and Row 1991) . EDI technology creates some advantage only after considerable time (Impact C). In contrast, our investigation provides the clue to this puzzle. The answer stems from the high degree of association between an advanced EDI linkage and an old one. Of the 68 customers with an advanced linkage, 49 had established EDI with the supplier more than 42 months earlier. Our detailed investigations showed that most EDI linkages started as simple EDI; later, the supplier enhanced many of these linkages. In other words, the results of Hypothesis 4 seem to be driven by the pres-ence or absence of enhanced EDI linkages, rather than the passage of time.
In summary, we establish that the supplier obtains strategic benefits under two conditions: if a customer initiates the linkage, or if the supplier makes additional investments in this linkage. To examine these drivers further, we make a triangular comparison of the three sets. For Set c (Figure 2 ) the linkage is initiated by the customer and subsequently enhanced by the supplier (n = 40). The Set b (Figure 2 ) represents customers in which the linkage was initiated by the customer but did not have enhanced characteristics (n = 24). Finally, Set e (Figure 2 ) had enhanced characteristics, but was initiated by the supplier (n = 28).
To make the comparison between the three sets (c, b, and e), we first calculate the additional sales from the EDI customer over the matched manual customer from Set a ( Figure 2 ). Next, we use a Jonckheere test for ordered alternatives (Siegel and Castellan 1988) to compare the three types of EDI linkages. The test confirms that the median additional sales for the three groups are not the same (p < 0 05). To examine these differences, we use a robust rank-order test for two independent groups to compare the two medians without assuming that the underlying distributions are the same. This test reveals no differences between Sets b and e (p = 0 05), but significant differences whenever Set c is compared to Set b or Set e (using a one-tailed test). The implication is that an electronic linkage initiated by a customer and later enhanced by the supplier (Set c) generates the maximum strategic benefits for the supplier.
To summarize our findings, our field study underscores that the implementation of EDI generates a significant strategic advantage for a supplier. This gain is however, dependent on the technological choices made. A closer look at the EDI system's characteristics shows the full potential for strategic benefits of EDI. For example, in this study, the supplier derives additional business if a customer initiates the system or the supplier enhances the system's capabilities by making additional investments (Impact A and C).
2 Indeed, the supplier gains the maximum benefits when both of these conditions are true. From a theoretical perspective, this scenario seems to create the highest reduction in transaction costs for the buyer and the maximum negative externalities for other suppliers. As explained before, the gains from Impact C can be traced back to the operational efficiency improvements. This analysis is presented below.
Operational Benefits
We focus on the order-processing system at PMI and examine two measures relating to operational performance: (1) the intensity of delayed customer payments and (2) intensity of credits arising from erroneous order processing.
The operational relationship between a buyer and a supplier is one in which the supplier provides products and services in exchange for payments. In this relationship the supplier's primary goals are to provide quality products and services with the fewest possible errors, and to obtain timely payment. The supplier gains as EDI reduces costs as a result of errors in processing orders and delays in receiving payments. We thus focus on operational costs in the order-processing and accounts receivable (payable) areas of the supplier (customer). Note that the operational benefits are generated by EDI through reengineering of the internal processes of an organization, unlike strategic benefits that result from changes in the buyer-supplier trading relationship.
Formal Models
We next discuss the drivers of two operational benefits to both parties. These are timely payments and line-item compliance. Higher levels of performance of each measure leads to lower consumption of support resources at either end for information processing related to order management and execution.
Drivers of Delayed Payment. Delayed payments hurt both parties. From a collection standpoint, the supplier clearly strives for low intensity of delayed payments. The customer also has a strong incentive to pay bills by a given deadline. On-time payments are rewarded with discounts, and late payments receive significant penalties. Thus both the supplier and the
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customer have an incentive to decrease the percentage of orders that lead to delayed payments.
The drivers of timely payment authorization are factors related to both the information system and process management. With respect to the exchange of information, note that the payment-authorization process is triggered by the arrival of the incoming invoice. The electronic transfer of this information from the supplier to the customer's accounting system allows the authorization process to begin earlier than manual transfer does. Electronic invoicing also facilitates the matching process by providing more accurate invoice data to the customer's accounts payable department. Thus we arrive at Hypothesis 5:
Hypothesis 5. Electronic invoicing decreases the probability of a delayed payment.
Note that the probability of a delay is not affected for customers with a simple EDI linkage since the supplier has implemented only the purchase-order transaction, not the electronic invoicing function. To discover the impact of the information exchange, we must control for three aspects of order management that affect the matching process for payments: (a) the use of blanket orders, (b) the number of standard items, and (c) the complexity of the order.
(a) Blanket Orders. The fraction of blanket orders shows the amount of matching work that is routine. By establishing regular, predetermined orders, the supplier and customer can reduce the variability and uncertainty in the payment-authorization activity. In essence, it streamlines the payment cycle.
(b) Standard Items. The fraction of standard items ordered is a measurement of the standardization of the process. A standard item is manufactured to stock as opposed to an item manufactured to order. Of the items ordered by the customer, therefore, the fraction of standard items affects the ease of handling the matching process. If the fraction is low, many of the customer's parts are customized with nonroutine processes by the accounting department. Thus, increasing the amount of routine work relative to the amount of exception work increases the speed of the process.
(c) Complexity of the Order. The complexity of the orders processed also affects the quality of the matching activity. As the complexity increases, the difficulty in the matching process also increases and the process slows down. The complexity of a customer's orders is measured by the average lines per order. Each line in an order is a separate part type, so an increase in the average number of part types per order represents an increase in the complexity of the order. We discuss next the drivers of credits in order processing.
Drivers of Credits. To model the relationship between EDI and credits, we analyze the receiving process for incoming orders for both categories of orders-manual and EDI. In the EDI environment, orders fall into one of two groups. The first group of orders is fully integrated. An integrated EDI link requires mapping between the customer's item identification code and the supplier's item code. Orders transmitted via integrated EDI are entered directly into the supplier's order-processing system without human intervention. An increase in the accuracy of the information is expected. Accuracy results in lower credits to the customer. In the second EDI group, orders are transmitted via EDI from the customer's purchasing system to a customer service center where the orders are printed and keyed into the computer system by the service representatives. These we call teletype EDI orders. Once in the order-processing system, both manual and teletype EDI orders are processed in the same manner. We thus propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6. The use of fully integrated EDI decreases the probability of a credit order.
As in the payment-process analysis, we control for four characteristics of the nature of the orders: (a) the number of Blanket orders, (b) the number of standard items in an order, (c) the complexity of an order (average line items per order), and (d) the size of the customer.
Data Collection
We use data covering the same 318 customers described in §3. Recall that half of these customers had electronic linkage with the supplier. In addition, manual customers are matched with the selected EDI customers in terms of customer size (sales) and the industry (based on three-digit SIC codes) to which they belong. Since the matching is based on exogenous characteristics, the empirical analysis does not change from that of a random sample (Hausman and Wise 1981) .
Although the size of our data set is modest, for each customer we have multiple observations of the binary random variables. For example, on an average, we have about 167 orders to estimate the probability of a delayed payment and 331 line items to estimate the probability of rework for each customer. We randomly select 238 observations (119 EDI customers and 119 matched manual customers) to estimate our models and use the remaining 80 data points as a holdout sample to test the predictive ability of our estimation results.
Model Estimation
In this section, we discuss the estimation of both models described in §4.1.
Estimation of Delayed Payment. The fraction of customers with no delayed payments (1.89%) is small, indicating that this limiting value is not important for our estimation. Thus the Probit model is appropriate for the estimation of the probability of delayed payments. We estimate our model using the weighted least squares estimator (Amemiya 1985) . The explanatory power of the estimated model shown in Table 4 is high, the pseudo-R 2 = 0 597 (Judge et al. 1998 ). Furthermore, the Goldfield and Quandt test shows no significant levels of heteroskedasticity based on the type of the information exchange (manual and EDI) (p = 0 05). A 2 test based on the holdout sample also rejects the null hypothesis that all model coefficients are zero at the 99% confidence level. We also used the Wald test to verify jointly that the coefficients of electronic order and sales are not significantly different from zero (p = 0 05). The estimate of the coefficient of electronic invoice is negative and significant, providing evidence to support Hypothesis 5. Electronic invoicing makes invoicing information available to the customer far earlier than manual invoicing. Moreover, the information content of the invoice is more accurate. The customer's accounting department is thus able to begin the payment-authorization process earlier, and payment matching is far more efficient. Per our expectation, the coefficient of electronic order is not significant.
The fraction of standard items (fraction standard) also has a negative effect on the probability, and the estimator is significantly different from zero. By increasing the fraction of routine transactions, the supplier and customer streamline the matching process. The effect of blanket orders (fraction blanket) is also significant, but contrary to our expectations. Further investigation reveals the cause. Customers often do not mention that they are exercising a blanket agreement, so such orders are erroneously treated as ordinary orders and lead to additional processing problems.
Finally, the coefficient of the number of lines per order (line/order) is positive and significant. These results support our belief that an increase in the complexity of the orders decreases the efficiency of the matching process. Therefore, payments are delayed. The probability of delayed payment reduces with customer size (sales), but this result is not statistically significant.
Estimation of Credits. Many customers have no credits for each type of information exchange. For these customers, the dependent variable (the probability of rework) takes the limiting value of zero. Even for those customers that take the limiting value, the independent variables are observable. That is, we know the nature of the information exchange and order management for customers that did not incur credit during the study period. Given the high frequency of the occurrence of the limiting value of the probability of credit, we use the Tobit model for this analysis.
To estimate the values of the parameters, we use the quasi-Newton method to maximize the globally convex log-likelihood function (Amemiya 1985) . We test the explanatory power of the model and the significance of individual estimators by the likelihood-ratio method. The hypothesis test of the full model produces the value 26.48 for the test statistic, which is significant at the 99% confidence level. Furthermore, the Goldfield and Quandt test shows no significant levels of heteroskedasticity based on the type of the information exchange. A 2 test based on the holdout sample also rejects the null hypothesis that all model coefficients are zero at the 99% confidence level. Table 5 shows coefficient estimates and the results of the hypothesis tests on the level of the significance of the individual parameters.
The estimate of the coefficient of electronic integration is −0 112, which supports the theory that EDI with full integration increases the probability that a customer has credit-free orders and decreases the number of credits (Hypothesis 6). As expected, the coefficient of electronic order is not statistically significant, indicating that the probability of credit does not shrink if the electronic linkage is not fully integrated.
The sign of the coefficient of fraction standard is consistent with our expectations and statistically significant, but the coefficient of fraction blanket is contrary to our expectations, although not significant. As stated earlier, blanket orders are often subject to pricing errors because customers frequently do not identify such orders. The complexity of the order plays an important role; the estimate of the coefficient of line/order is 0.058 and significantly different from zero at the 95% level. 
Discussion
Our analysis has clearly established the priorities in terms of technology deployment and the consequent benefits for the trading partners engaged in electronic commerce. First, the maximum business growth for a supplier occurs when the customer initiates the electronic link, and the supplier adopts and enhances the link. For instance, in our field study compared to manual linkages, the supplier obtains more than 50% additional sales with an enhanced electronic linkage initiated by the customer. Second, the supplier and customer reduce the cost of business by improving efficiencies in the order-completion cycle. The study confirms that the incidence of delayed payment reduces substantially with electronic invoicing, and the frequency of errors in order processing diminishes due to integrated EDI. As a result of these gains, the partners reduce overhead expenses of order processing and payment. At our site, this reduction was 12% in the support cost category for the supplier. We have also attempted to close the loop between the two impacts B and C (Figure 1 ). We are however constrained by the availability of data, and hence the strategic impact model and the process model could not be integrated fully. We were able to obtain additional process performance data (credit intensity) for a selected set of EDI customers (Set c in Figure 2 representing customer initiated and supplier enhanced EDI linkage) for the previous two years giving us three consecutive years (Year 1, 2, and 3) of data. Likewise, sales data for the same years was obtained for these customers and their matched pair of manual customers. Thus process and sales data could be cross-tabulated for 18 customer accounts. This analysis showed a significant improvement in process performance from Year 1 to 2 followed by marginal improvement in the following year. In contrast, the strategic benefits were delayed, and were significant only in the final year after the process gains were accrued by Year 2. These findings provide evidence that PMI was awarded a higher business by customers after achieving process gains through advanced technology. This analysis therefore is consistent with our research framework, and partially closes the loop between process gains and strategic benefit in a limited measure.
Finally, from a research perspective, we develop and test an integrative framework to couple both the strategic and operational gains of EDI. We show that the strategic benefits accrue from two components. First, the supplier benefits directly from adopting a customer initiated program, and is rewarded with higher sales volume by the customer. Second, with higher deployment of the technology and its use, the order completion process significantly improves at both the supplier and the customer ends. This in turn leads to a secondary impact further generating additional sales revenue to the supplier from the customer. We have thus outlined a comprehensive framework to systematically ascertain the direct and indirect impacts of technology from both strategic and operational viewpoints for future work.
While our results are strong, they should be interpreted with caution. The issue of generalizability is a common cause of concern for a field study, especially those dealing with nascent technologies. We have mitigated this problem by a careful selection of customers from a wide range of industries (across the two-digit SIC codes). In addition, we also matched the EDI and manual customers based on their size and industry profile. Our modeling also systematically accounted for the differences in procurement process characteristics across the customer base. Nonetheless, further validation of our research framework should be conducted to replicate our findings in a cross-section of product markets. The magnitude of the impacts we expect will vary across different implementations, but the nature of the findings should be robust. Our study also underscores the need to conduct a systematic time-series analysis linking process and strategic measures with technology implementation and deployment.
Our focus in this study was to quantify the EDI benefits for a supplier. Other studies (e.g., Srinivasan et al. 1994 ) have examined the benefits accrued to the customer. Future work should address jointly both the customer as well as supplier's gains, and contrast the levels of these benefits. As B2B commerce expands, our findings will be further investigated and supported across diverse industry settings.
Conclusion
Prior work has primarily considered the impact of EDI for large manufacturers acting as buyers (e.g., Mukhopadhyay 1992, Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995) . Strategic benefits are clearly different for customers and suppliers (Riggins and Mukhopadhyay 1993) , but no study has systematically investigated the benefits of EDI from a supplier's perspective.
Our results confirm that EDI leads to a range of benefits to an industrial supplier depending on how technology choices are made by the trading partners. For example, if the electronic link is initiated by a customer and enhanced by the supplier, it generates substantial additional revenue for the supplier. When a supplier joins the EDI link initiated by a customer, the customer's transaction costs decline, creating positive externalities for the customer and negative externalities for other suppliers. Similarly, when the supplier enhances the electronic link, it creates additional procedural specificity, thus reducing the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the customer in future.
Advanced EDI also significantly reduces the probability of rework and delay, thus lowering the supplier's and customer's order-processing costs. The simplification of the process by reducing the complexity of orders or increasing the fraction of standard items sold also improves business performance. In contrast, the simple EDI practiced by many suppliers, however, does not generate many benefits. It automates the transmission of purchase orders, but it neither integrates EDI into the internal business processes nor employs EDI to expedite the payment process.
In conclusion, the role of EDI in business continues to evolve over time, and our findings will be reinforced as more companies adopt integrated EDI. At present, its role is limited to localized application (e.g., the purchase-or order-processing area), although it is beginning to lead to internal integration and business process redesign (Venkatraman 1994) . Thus the need for continuing research in this area is critical. As with any field study of EDI (e.g., Srinivasan et al. 1994) , our results should be interpreted with caution. On one hand, our empirical tests exhibit high external validity. On the other hand, our theoretical analyses and hypotheses will be subjected to further testing to improve the generalizability of the results. In the absence of secondary data, further empirical analysis would require the kind of primary data collection used in our study.
With the growth of B2B commerce, we are confident that our field study will trigger a stream of research on integrated information exchange. As XML standards emerge in different industries, the electronic procurement process is shifting increasingly to the Internet. As this new environment expands, we envision a systematic examination of the research questions in the context of our framework. The strategic and operational benefits through integration in B2B procurement will become even more important in the future.
